





















Bureaucracy and Public Management 
Reforms: Evidence from Pakistan




  321.015(549) 
  35.072.22(549) 
Review scientific paper / pregledni znanstveni rad 
Received / primljeno:  24. 7. 2019.
Accepted / prihvaćeno:  10. 1. 2020.
Competent and professional bureaucracy is behind the 
good functioning of any government. The study examines 
the performance of Pakistani bureaucracy by using histor-
ical reports and semi-structured interviews, as well as by 
reviewing the literature. This study consists of six parts. 
Part one describes the introduction to new public man-
agement and bureaucracy; part two discusses the bureau-
cratic history of Pakistan; part three is about theoretical 
insights. Part four is about methodology. Part five presents 
interview analysis and discussion; part six concludes the 
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study and suggests appropriate reforms. The bureaucracy 
in Pakistan suffers from problems such as nepotism, po-
litical instability, and interference, horse-trading, delays 
in posting, low wages, selection without merit, incompe-
tence, etc. The study suggests that the reform programme 
should consider the political will, secure environment, on-
job training, power-sharing hierarchy, elimination of cor-
ruption and nepotism, competitive salary, and merit-based 
selection.
Keywords: bureaucracy, bureaucratic reforms, public man-
agement reforms, administrative institution, bureaucratic 
structure and functions
1. Introduction
The New Public Management (NPM) has been widely discussed and 
debated after the seminal contribution of Hood (1991, 1995) capturing 
the attention in the field of public administration. Verbeeten and Spekle 
(2015) define NPM as a “set of beliefs, doctrines, and codified expe-
riences that collectively serve as a frame of reference in the evaluation 
and redesign of the public sector” Hood (1991) and Pollitt (2002) ar-
gue that this frame of reference varies over time and across countries. 
Arellano-Gault and Lepore (2011), O’Reilly and Reed (2011) and Town-
ley, Cooper and Oakes (2003) describe NPM as “a quest for econom-
ic rationality and a strong trust in market-based discipline, managerial 
control, and hands-on management”. Several studies have discussed the 
NPM reforms programme (Levy, 2010; Osborne, 2006, 2010; Dunleavy, 
Margetts, Bastov & Tinkler, 2005). Hood (1991, 1995) described NPM 
based on his observations from the UK during the 1980s. Hyndman and 
Lapsley (2016) explained that the main emphasis of NPM was on mar-
ket-like structures, private sector management styles, frugality, focus on 
measurement, and result-oriented controls. Pollitt (2001) found that by 
adopting NPM, values have shifted from universalism and equity towards 
efficiency and individualism. Similarly, Fountain (2001) emphasized the 
importance of markets and market-based systems. Christensen and Lae-
gried (2007) and Van Thiel and Pollitt (2007) argue that NPM is very 
flexible and can change according to circumstances. However, Van Thiel 
and Pollitt (2007) and Andrews (2010) document that the basic idea of 
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NPM remains the same. The local context of NPM may change according 
to the specific nature of the policies adopted. The theory of new institu-
tional economics with a particular focus on public choice, transaction cost 
theory, principal-agent theory, and neo-scientific oriented management 
studies shaped the thinking about NPM (Hood, 1991). McCann, Has-
sard, Granter and Hyde (2015) argue that lean management is a perfect 
example of neo-scientific oriented management studies. Pollit (2016) ar-
gues that managerialism is the heart of administrative practice and public 
service. Managerialism is the particular branch of NPM that deals with 
the performance and control of the public sector.
The bureaucratic structure of Pakistan follows the Westminster model 
of government. Pakistan was under British colonial rule and it has had 
profound effects on the bureaucracy of Pakistan. Cultural and colonial 
legacies have a strong influence on the way civil servants and public in-
stitutions function in South Asia (Jamil, Askvik, & Hossain, 2013). The 
Indian Civil Service has the best administrative machinery because it has 
the characteristics of impersonality, neutrality, dedication, high ethical 
standards, and esprit de corps. Sabharwal and Berman (2013) argue that 
the ICS resembles the legal-rational authority system identified by Max 
Weber. They further state that bureaucracy has the characteristics of mer-
it-based recruitment and promotion, hierarchy, fixed salary, the separa-
tion between private and official life, impersonal order (official functions 
bound by rules), tenure of service, and stability.
However, the culture of give and take is rather common in the bureaucrat-
ic system of Pakistan and other south Asian countries (Jamil, Dhakal & 
Paudel, 2019). Elitism has been a hallmark of the Pakistani administrative 
system. There have been several reforms since the independence whose 
emphasis was on representative bureaucracy, i.e. on allotting more deci-
sion-making powers to bureaucrats and civil servants. Post-independence 
reforms also focused on reducing elitism among different public services 
so they could be more citizen-centric and more responsive to the needs of 
society (Jamil, Dhakal, & Paudel, 2019). The Pakistani bureaucracy has 
faced severe upheavals due to its highly unstable and corrupt political sys-
tem. So far, there have been four periods of martial law interchanged with 
weak democratic governments based on self-interest instead of national 
interest. That is why the system was more inclined towards corruption, 
nepotism, incompetence, and injustice (Shahzad, 2017). Government in-
stability has caused poor bureaucratic performance. 
Each government has identified their team among bureaucrats, who re-
mained on top administrative positions during their respective tenures. 
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These people are experts in running government affairs and they know 
how to cash the rulers. Their controversial standing has stigmatized their 
role of loyalty to their country. Until today, each government in Pakistan 
has announced reforms, but they resulted in no change and the circum-
stances remained the same (LaPorte, 1981). The reform programmes 
failed to be implemented correctly, which increased the incompetence of 
public sector employees who were unable to deliver results. The main rea-
son for this is political interference. Bajwa and Ansari (2018) argue that 
Pakistani bureaucracy usually follows the will of political masters (minis-
ters). Aminullah (2012) argues that the very heart of bureaucracy needs 
reset, which is only possible through the will of government. The aim of 
this study is to present a detailed analysis of the Pakistani bureaucracy in 
the light of new public management reforms. 
The first part of the study discusses the historical overview of the Paki-
stani bureaucracy. It is followed by theoretical insights in part two, while 
part three presents the methods of gathering and analysing data. Results 
and discussion are given in part four and part five concludes the study.
2. Historical Overview of the Pakistani  
Bureaucracy 
After gaining independence, Pakistan inherited weak and inexperienced 
political leadership that was expected to manage the affairs of the new 
state. However, the civil service immediately started to perform their role 
as the British trained them. Gorvine (1965) noted that civil servants be-
gan to work on the long list of monolithic tasks faced by the government. 
These included maintenance of law and order, settlement of refugees, 
allotment of land, and establishment of a fully functional system of the 
sovereign state despite having administrative difficulties such as shortage 
of offices and trained human resources. Braibanti (1966) argued that the 
most severe problem Pakistan faced after independence was the shortage 
of managerial talent. He stated that 1,157 employees were working in the 
Indian Civil Services (ICS). Only 157 employees joined the civil servic-
es in Pakistan, including 95 Muslims. LaPalombara (1963) documented 
that only 9 per cent of Muslims joined ICS during 1947. The main rea-
son for the low representation of Indian Muslims in ICS was traditional 
and anti-western education stance. Ziring and LaPorte (1974) and Sayeed 
(1958) mentioned that several British officers were hired on certain cru-
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cial positions like the Secretary Establishment and the three Provincial 
Governors to fill in this gap. However, despite serious problems, civil serv-
ants started to work without offices and official buildings across Karachi. 
Huntington (1968) documented that the Pakistani bureaucracy provided 
leadership and security and due to their hard work, Pakistan managed to 
perform well in the first 90 days after independence. Pakistani public ad-
ministration was politically pressured for favours right after its independ-
ence. However, Quaid-e-Azam established specific rules of administrative 
functioning that removed the fear of political pressure.
The expansion of government also demanded the recruitment of numerous 
officials in various government departments. The criteria for selection of 
these bureaucrats were quite lax as there was lenience with regard to qual-
ifications and age. It went so far that the candidates were selected without 
any competitive exams (Iqbal, 2014). The chosen candidates would be 
promoted quickly. The quota reserved for provinces further undermined 
the merit of civil servants during the selection process. The unfortunate 
death of Quaid-e-Azam (founder of Pakistan) provided an opportunity 
for politicians to interfere in state affairs (Ahmed, 1970). The first-ever 
trial of civil servants was held in 1952, when 735 civil servants were pros-
ecuted on charges of corruption, hoarding, and black marketing (Iqbal, 
2014). Ahmed (1970) and Musarrat and Azhar (2012) argue that this was 
the first time when the character and prestige of Pakistani civil servants 
was contaminated by the prevalence of nepotism and favouritism in the 
civil service. Since then, Pakistani public administration has not regained 
respect and the public has continued to perceive it as an unresponsive, in-
effective, and corrupt institution (ICG, 2010). President Iskander Mirza 
suspended 303 Class-I officers (including senior officers) on charges of 
misconduct, misuse of power, and corruption in 1969. Prime Minister Z. 
A. Bhutto forcibly dismissed 1,300 bureaucrats in 1971 on the charges 
of misconduct and corruption. He introduced a class system (Class-I to 
Class-V) to public administration (mandarins), unrivalled in its arrogance 
and snobbery (Kaushik, 1985). 
Z. A. Bhutto initiated a comprehensive bureaucratic reforms programme 
in 1973, and later numerous attempts were made by various governments 
to improve the bureaucratic performance. However, the performance 
of bureaucracy keeps on deteriorating because of corruption, red-tape, 
and financial burden (Iqbal, 2014). The primary reason behind the fail-
ure of bureaucratic reforms is political instability and weak political will 
(Memon, Memon, Memon, & Shaikh, 2011). Jamil, Dhakal and Paudel, 
(2019) document that the total number of civil servants in Pakistan is 3.4 
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million (18%) of the population of 190.4 million (there is one bureaucrat 
for every 56 people). There is wide dissatisfaction with the public admin-
istration performance in Pakistan (ICG, 2010).  
Table 1. Reform Initiatives in Pakistan
Chairman Name or primary focus Year
M. Munir Pay and Scale 1949
R. Egger
Decentralization in Decision-making and Im-




The Reorganization of the role of Pakistan’s Go-




Reorganization of Administrative  Reforms in 
Pakistan
1961
A. R. Cornelius Pay and Service Commission Report 1959–1962
M. Shoaib
Defined Roles and Distribution of Responsibi-
lities
1962
K. H. Meer Administrative Reform Commission Report 1973
Anwar-ul-Haq
Revise Already Suggested Administrative Re-
forms
The Civil Services Commission Report  
National Reconstruction Bureau







National Commission for Government Reforms
Decentralization of the Civil Service Reform 
Program




Source: Authors, based on Iqbal (2014); Jamil, Dhakal, & Paudel (2019)
Table 1 lists the reform programmes introduced by both autocratic and 
democratic governments to improve the quality and performance of pub-
lic administration. However, the reform programmes mostly failed due 
to frequent changes of political-military regimes. Polidano (2001) argues 
that the reforms failed either because of unsatisfactory results or because 
these programmes were never implemented. Consistent with Polidano’s 
(2001) analysis, we can conclude that not a single Pakistani reform pro-
gramme has been completed in its entirety. Wilder (2009) and Bajwa 
and Ansari (2018) mention that in the last seven decades, different gov-
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ernment commissions have issued more than twenty studies concerning 
administrative reforms. However, only few recommendations have been 
implemented to curb the bureaucracy. Table 2 presents the pattern of 
government switchovers in Pakistan.
Table 2. Democratic and Dictatorial Ruling Pattern in Pakistan
Eras Period
First democratic era  1947–1958
First military era  1958–1971
Second democratic era  1971–1977
Second military era  1977–1988
Third democratic era  1988–1999
Third military era  1999–2008
Fourth democratic era  2008–2013
Fifth democratic era 2013-2018
Sixth democratic era     2018-present
Source: Authors, based on Iqbal (2014)
The emphasis of the administrative reform programme introduced in 
1971 was on reformation, reorganization, and organization of the pub-
lic sector, including its size, structure, pay, scale, powers and authority, 
etc. A major reform initiative was the nationalization of private corpora-
tions and putting bureaucracy under the control of political leadership by 
amending the constitution (Iqbal, 2014). The public sector could not reap 
the modernizing benefits of globalization. Various changes in government 
also affected the economic growth, which set the path for international 
assistance. Pakistan also initiated the NPM reforms programme during 
the 1990s to improve the performance of the public sector and recov-
er from fiscal imbalances. However, the government altered its existing 
role to facilitate and reduce the cost and size of public administration to 
exit from markets through deregulation and privatization. The different 
governments also promoted private sector practices by adopting manage-
rialism policy to enhance the performance and efficiency of public sector 
employees. These reform programmes changed the traditional concept of 
nationalism by promoting innovation, privatization, and decentralization. 
During the 2000s, the military-led government of Pakistan paid particular 
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attention to modernizing the public sector under the agenda of good gov-
ernance in cooperation with international developing partners.
Similarly, the democratic government also works hard for the betterment 
of the administrative system. The current government has introduced 
the use of Information Communication Technologies to improve the 
performance of public sector employees. Consequently, the institution-
al reforms aim to accelerate the economic growth and alleviate poverty 
through better tax administration, devolution of power to local govern-
ments, procurement, and financial management. Pakistan has initiated 
administrative reforms several times, but they failed to produce the de-
sired results. There are numerous reasons behind the failure. The main 
reason is that the NPM model was not in line with the social, geographic, 
political, and economic circumstances of the country. Most of the time, 
Pakistan borrowed the elements of the NPM model from the US and Eu-
rope. Even today it is following the European model. Therefore, the main 
reason behind the country’s struggling with the public service reform is 
the lack of an indigenous NPM model that would encompass its socio-po-
litical, economic, and geographic values.
The other reasons include political and government interests, chosen type 
of government change, and the resistance of the civil service. The govern-
ment have shown interest in the civil service management reforms, but it 
was only to convince the intellectual circle that they were vested in mak-
ing changes. In reality, the government’s goal was either to serve their po-
litical interest or merely to plan for spending their mandate without doing 
too much work. Serving in a public office establishes a change-resistant 
mindset. The change of attitude is a gradual and time-consuming process. 
Therefore, it is necessary to build change culture in a well-thought and 
programmed manner. 
3. Theoretical Insights
This study follows Max Weber’s theory of bureaucracy and the New Pub-
lic Management approach to provide theoretical insights. The mix of the 
two is used because the first deals with the very foundation of bureaucracy 
and the second is a more advanced, up-to-date, and applied version of 
modern-day public management. Max Weber believed bureaucracy to be 
the most essential and efficient way of establishing an organization and 
administration. Weber preferred bureaucracy to the traditional structures. 
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In a bureaucratic organization, every employee has a well-defined role. 
These organizations followed highly systematic procedural and stand-
ardized rules and regulations. In bureaucratic organizations, promotions 
and rewards are performance-, skills-, and qualifications-based (Mulder, 
2017). Weber’s theory of bureaucracy has six essential principles, i.e. task 
specialization, hierarchical authority, formal selection, rules and regula-
tions, impersonality, and career orientation.
In the 1980s, the United Kingdom (UK), the USA, and Australia adopt-
ed NPM in order to improve the public sector efficiency. It is a private 
sector management model that puts citizens in the centre of concern of 
all the public services. This approach believes in networking, teamwork, 
and decentralization (Hood & Jackson, 1991; Hood, 1991). Osborne and 
Gaebler (1992) claimed that by the NPM principles, the role of govern-
ment should be steering towards the provision of public services; it should 
be community-oriented and provide competition opportunities for its cit-
izens, and the government should enforce and implement rules via the 
creation of agencies. However, Osborne and Plastrik (2000) argued that 
these principles were subsequently reduced and converted into an imple-
mentation plan with elements of consequences, core, control, customers, 
and culture. Dunn and Miller (2007) argue that NPM provides solutions 
for different issues, ideas, and reform recipes and provide several reasons 
for the failure of NPM in developing countries in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope and the Commonwealth of the Independent States. These reasons 
are external and internal conflicts, and a hyper-pluralistic political party 
system. The civil services in these countries suffer from ethnicity issues, 
poor systems of healthcare and education, inadequate economic and en-
vironmental regulation, and weak economies under the influence of the 
World Bank and IMF. 
Dunn and Miller (2007) further stated that NPM neglected the broad-
er governmental, political, socio-cultural contexts while emphasizing the 
improvement of management functions called “managerialism”. NPM 
does not intend to replace the Weberian bureaucratic model. Drechsler 
(2005) argues that NPM reforms have failed to achieve their objectives 
of making more efficient and effective public sector organizations set by 
American and British advocates. 
A new administrative approach called the Neo-Weberian State (NWS) 
has emerged in Europe to challenge the concept of NPM. Pollitt and 
Bouckaert (2004) identified the features of NWS. The NWS redefines 
the role of countries and provides the solution to the problems that arose 
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through technological change, environmental threat, globalization, and 
shifting demographics. It also reaffirms the legitimate role of the state as 
representative of democracy at the central, regional, and local levels and it 
re-confirms the role of administrative law in providing equality, legal secu-
rity, and specialized judicial scrutiny of state actions. It preserves the idea 
of public service with a distinctive status, culture, and terms and condi-
tions. The NWS follows the external orientation of bureaucratic rules that 
fulfils the citizens’ needs and wishes by adopting a professional lifestyle 
of quality and service. It ensures representative democracy and a range 
of devices for consultation and recording citizens’ views. The NWS also 
emphasizes the role of the state in modernization of the laws for disburse-
ment of government resources so that maximum benefit can be achieved 
by using minimum resources.
4. Methods
This study uses qualitative semi-structured interviews to examine its ob-
jective empirically. Bradford and Cullen (2012) argue that qualitative 
semi-structured interviews are one of the most widely used and dominant 
methods of data collection within social sciences. Flick (2009) claims that 
semi-structured interviews are valuable as they permit researchers to iden-
tify subjective viewpoints and collect in-depth information from people’s 
experiences. Choak (2012) argues that semi-structured interviews use the 
interview schedule, which enables researchers to address a defined topic 
and allow the respondents to answer in their own words and discuss is-
sues and problems pertinent to them. He further mentions that the inter-
view schedule should guide the interviewee and develop relevant themes 
throughout the interview. There should be a flow in conversation (Choak, 
2012; Rubin & Rubin, 2005). Semi-structured interviews are popular in 
social sciences and reflect their independence from a single epistemolog-
ical position or theoretical framework. Braun and Clarke (2006) argue 
that qualitative semi-structured interviews used to consider experiences, 
meanings, and reality of participant’s skills to explore how assumptions 
inform these experiences, facts, implications, and discourses or ideas that 
exist within the broader society. Keller and Conradin (2019) claim that 
conducting semi-structured interviews requires proper identification of 
respondents (known as key-informants), thoughtful planning and prepa-
ration for interviews. 
67























In any semi-structured interview, it is crucial to determine the saturation 
point of data as it specifies the comprehensive process of data collec-
tion and analysis (Majid, Othman, Mohamad, & Lim, 2018). Glaser and 
Strauss (1967) argue that the saturation point has been achieved when no 
new insights or data emerges from interviews. Similarly, Charmaz (2006) 
argues that the saturation point has been reached when no new codes 
are generated from interviews, and the collected data do not offer new 
insights. A study by Bavik (2016) shows that 18 interviews have occurred 
to reach the point of saturation. There have been 27 civil servants inter-
viewed for this study because of similarity in recruitment procedures and 
office environment. We achieved data saturation after the 24th interview. 
The semi-structured interviews have been done directly with the field ex-
perts by following the snowball sampling technique. The samples were se-
lected from the employees in the Pakistani federal civil service, occupying 
positions of grade 17 and above, and further divided within departments/
ministries as section officers, assistant directors, deputy secretaries, direc-
tors, joint secretaries, director generals, additional secretaries, and secre-
taries. The list of shortlisted questions is available in Appendix 1. We have 
identified several themes for further analysis during the interview to assess 
the performance of civil servants. These themes include demographic in-
formation, information about recruitment policy, syllabus and examina-
tions of competitive exams, human resource development, performance 
management/reward system in their organizations, accountability and pe-
nalization, evaluation criteria, remunerations standards, available perks 
and privileges, and other problems like political interference and corrup-
tion, etc.
5. Results and Discussion
5.1. Descriptive Analysis
Table 3 shows the demographic information of key respondents included 
in the analysis. The key-informant interviewees are ten section officers, 
two assistant directors, four deputy secretaries, two directors, two joint 
secretaries, three director generals, two additional secretaries, and two 
secretaries. The demographic statistics show that civil servants have a 
different level of education, ranging from BA to PhD degrees, and they 
are specialized in various fields including social sciences, pharmaceutical 
sciences, management, and natural sciences.
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Table 3. Demographics of the BPS-17 and above civil servants (total number 
of interviewees: 27)





1 Section Officer  
(BPS-17)






1 Management Sciences 
1 Natural Sciences
2 Assistant Director 
(BPS-17)
2 Masters 1 Social  Sciences
1 Management Sciences
3 Section Officer  
(BPS-18)
5 3 MPhil 
2 Masters
3 Social Sciences 
2 Natural sciences
4 Deputy Secretaries 
(BPS-19)
4 1 PhD








6 Director Generals 
(BPS-20)
3 3 MPhil 2 Social Sciences 
1 Medical Sciences




1 Social Sciences 
1 Management Sciences
8 Additional Secretary 
(BPS-21)
2 2 MPhil Social Sciences
9 Secretary (BPS-22) 2 1 Master
1 MPhil
1 Social Sciences 
1 Management Sciences 
Source: Authors
5.2. Thematic Analysis
The semi-structured interviews provided in-depth, relevant information 
from federal civil servants employed in different ministries/departments. 
These civil servants had different academic levels and specializations. Sur-
prisingly, their education level did not match the positions’ demands. For 
instance, some of them with bachelor degrees in medical sciences, phar-
maceutical science, and engineering sciences serve in the department of 
finance and commerce. Furthermore, a person with a PhD and a person 
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with a BA degree both work at the same level. Some government employ-
ees work in departments that do not match their level of education and 
professional competency. The respondents often agree about the prob-
lems that hinder the administrative performance.
The respondents have highlighted several issues that affect the perfor-
mance and overall efficiency. The problems identified with regard to the 
poor performance include the problems with recruitment and selection 
processes, training and development programmes, remuneration system, 
low salaries, political interference, poor accountability and transparency 
system, no apparent performance indicators such as retirement age and 
benefits and other perks and privileges, etc. Table 4 provides the rankings 
of the reasons behind poor performance, as suggested by respondents.





1 Issues of corruption 1st 85.18
2 Issues with recruitment and selection 2nd 81.48 
3
Issues with academic levels and speci-
alization
3rd 77.77
4 Political interference 4th 74.07
5
Poor accountability and transparency 
system
5th 70.37
6 Issues with skills and relevant training 6th 66.66
7 No clear Performance Indicators 7th 62.96
8 Low salaries 8th 59.25
9 Limited perks and privileges 9th 55.55
10 Issues with the retirement age 10th 51.85
Source: Authors
The respondents agree that bureaucratic performance is poor, and they 
mentioned that the main reason for that is political interference. Political 
actors interfere in the structure and functions of public administration. 
This finding is also supported by Iqbal (2014), who mentioned that strong 
political influence has characterised the Pakistani public administration 
since independence. The second problem highlighted by respondents is 
corruption. They indicated that corruption in administration is caused by 
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political interference. Ministers allow corruption because they depend 
on civil servants. They usually form their teams or engage individual civil 
servants in order to protect their interests. Knowing this mechanism, civil 
servants also feel confident to get their share.
Quality human resource management practices are essential for the sur-
vival of an organization in the modern era. The interviewees somewhat 
agree with the statement. However, they are more inclined to the tradi-
tional seniority-based promotions and reward system. The respondents 
believe that crucial elements of public administration are teh hierarchical 
structure, the centralization of power, rules and regulations, and divided 
responsibilities. They are attracted by the power structure, status in soci-
ety, attractive salaries, perks, and privileges. 
The respondents have been asked about the recruitment and selection pro-
cess and they are aware of the differences between political and profession-
al recruitment. They notice that there are issues with regard to the required 
academic qualifications, lack of transparency in entrance exams, and re-
quired work experience. They have biased views about their own selection 
process as everyone claims they have been selected on merit. There are var-
ious deviations: person with MSc degree works at the position requiring a 
bachelor’s degree; someone without required specialisation holds a special-
ist post; a medical degree holder works in the customs department, etc. The 
respondents also mention that salaries equal to those in the private sector 
are essential. That would curb corruption in the civil service. Such a salary 
system would provide incentives for retention of quality personnel in public 
administration and prevent civil service’s human capital loss. The respond-
ents claim that their salaries are meagre, and sometimes they are pressured 
to accept bribes and other arrangements that interfere with their duties.  
The respondents have suggested several measures for improvement. These 
include merit-based recruitment and selection, specialized educational 
schemes, and training aimed at developing specialized skills. They suggest 
salaries equal to those in the private sector in order to avoid corruption. 
They also propose depoliticisation and eradication of nepotism. They rec-
ommend the improvement of the policy and legal frameworks that should 
have adequate policies, rules, regulations, procedures, in order to ensure 
transparency and accountability. Performance should be gauged against 
standardized parameters. Corruption must be punished. Retirement age 
should be raised from 60 to 65 years to get the maximum from the expe-
rienced officials. Etc.
According to the respondents, the reasons behind the failed reforms are 
lack of political will, political interference, corrupt management, nepo-
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tism, elitism, favouritism, status quo, and class differences among em-
ployees (Central Superior Services aspirants and non-CSS aspirants). 
Most of them claim that lack of ideas or recommendations is not the 
cause of reform failure. Instead, they believe that there is a lack of reform 
implementation capacity. Most of administrative leaders are inclined to 
put their personal interests ahead of national, which is a hindrance to 
reforms. Moreover, the civil service is reluctant to accept the changes. 
Shafqat (1999) argues that proper leadership and teamwork can ensure 
the efficient and active role of bureaucracy.
6. Conclusion
Pakistan has introduced numerous social, economic, and administrative 
reforms to equate the country with the dynamic, competent world. Public 
management reform agenda has remained every government’s key con-
cern. Reforms were necessary because the public administration system 
and structure were inherited from the colonial masters and mainly de-
signed to serve them (Khan & Zia, 2014), being unfit in a free country. 
Several administrative reforms lacked the desired results. The reason was 
that the government failed to create an indigenous public management 
model that would answer the social, political, economic, and geographic 
circumstances of the country. Instead, Pakistan introduced a borrowed 
NPM model that did not fit to the country.
The political instability has not created a favourable reform environment. 
There have been frequent changes of democratic governments and dic-
tatorships. Every government has promoted its interests, causing the 
frequent changes in governmental institutions. It paved the way for cor-
ruption and incompetence in public administration, decreasing its poli-
cy-making and implementation capacities. 
The analysis of historical experiences and respondents’ views suggests the 
need for creation of a viable and flexible public management model har-
monized with the country’s needs and circumstances, based on the neo 
Weberian and NPM models. The current government has planned to re-
form public administration. It has established the reform task force led by 
Ishrat Husain, an adviser to the Prime Minister and a former State Bank 
governor. Considering the importance of public administration for the 
country’s development, it is necessary to develop a skilled, well equipped, 
and technically sound bureaucracy.
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Appendix 1
Table: Main interview questions
S/No Main Questions
1 Demographic facts (name, age, department/ministry, designation, education, 
specialisation, etc.)
2 For how many years have you been working on this position? What are the 
problems you faced during your tenure?
3 What are the main reasons behind the poor performance of bureaucracy in 
Pakistan?
4 Why are reforms not implemented in Pakistan? Despite so many commissioned 
reform reports? 
5 What was the impact of bureaucratic reforms of 1971 on the performance of 
bureaucracy?
6 Do you think the nationalization of public sector institutions was a good reform 
step? 
7 In your opinion, which reason affects the most? Please rank the rest. 
76





8 What do you think about the privatization of public sector institutions as part 
of reforms?
9 Do you think the implementation of NPM or Neo Weberian State can improve 
the performance of Pakistani bureaucracy? 
Source: Authors, based on Iqbal (2014) and Wilder (2009).
BUREAUCRACY AND PUBLIC MANAGEMENT REFORMS: 
EVIDENCE FROM PAKISTAN
Summary
The paper examines administrative performance and public management re-
forms in Pakistan. The study is based on the expert opinion of the civil servants 
gathered via 27 semi-structured interviews. Pakistan has inherited the adminis-
trative structure from the British colonial raj. Although there have been numer-
ous reforms aimed at improving administrative performance, none of them have 
been implemented adequately. The changes pursued in the first two decades were 
related to enhancing the administrative performance by creating an adequate 
structure of administrative posts and ensuring a fair remuneration system. The 
first full reform package was presented in the 1970s with steps to improve the civil 
service performance and nationalization of significant banks and industries. The 
New Public Management (NPM) inspired the Pakistani government to adopt 
the policies of managerialism and privatization during the 1990s. The govern-
ment intended to remove the status quo and privatize the public sector industries. 
This reform was successful only with regard to the privatization of some sectors 
and banks. The remaining reform programme failed mostly because of political 
instability, weak political will, political interference with the reform process, etc. 
The semi-structured interviews conducted with Pakistani civil servants tackled 
the public administration problems and their possible solutions. The respond-
ents suggested that an indigenous public management model should be created. 
They indicated that the government should firmly support the implementation of 
reform measures. Civil servants should get salaries according to their expertise. 
There must be a well-defined and up to date performance and evaluation system 
able to ensure performance-based promotions, rewards, and punishments.
Keywords: bureaucracy, bureaucratic reforms, public management reforms, ad-
ministrative institution, bureaucratic structure and functions
77























UPRAVNE REFORME: SLUČAJ PAKISTANA
Sažetak
Analiziraju se učinkovitost javne uprave i upravne reforme u Pakistanu. Rad 
se temelji na analizi stručnih mišljenja skupljenih kroz 27 polustrukturiranih 
intervjua s državnim službenicima. Pakistan je naslijedio upravnu strukturu iz 
doba britanske kolonijalne vladavine. Usprkos pokušajima, ni jedna upravna 
reforma nije provedena na adekvatan način. Reforme tijekom prva dva deset-
ljeća samostalnosti bile su usmjerene na poboljšanje upravne uspješnosti stva-
ranjem prikladne strukture radnih mjesta i osiguranja dobrog sustava nagrađi-
vanja službenika. Prva sveobuhvatna reforma predstavljena je 1970-ih s ciljem 
poboljšanja upravnog djelovanja i nacionalizacije važnih banaka i industrija. 
Novi javni menadžment je potaknuo pakistansku vladu da se 1990-ih okrene 
menadžerskom pristupu i privatizaciji. Namjeravalo se prekinuti status quo i 
privatizirati dijelove javnog sektora. Ova je reforma bila djelomično uspješna jer 
je dovela do privatizacije samo nekih sektora i banaka. Ostatak reforme propao 
je zbog političke nestabilnosti, nedostatka političke volje i miješanja politike u 
reformski proces. Polustrukturirani intervjui su se odnosili na probleme u paki-
stanskoj javnoj upravi i moguća rješenja za njih. Ključnom se smatra potreba 
razvoja izvornog pakistanskog modela reforme javne uprave i osiguranja vladine 
podrške provođenju reformi. Državni službenici trebaju biti plaćeni prema svojoj 
stručnosti. Potreban je dobro razrađen i moderan sustav praćenja i vrednovanja 
uspješnosti koji može osigurati  napredovanje, nagrađivanje i kažnjavanje služ-
benika prema njihovoj uspješnosti.
Ključne riječi: javna uprava, upravne reforme, reforme javnog upravljanja, 
upravna institucija, upravna struktura i funkcije
